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JURISDICTION AMD MATURE OF THIS CASE 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2(a)-3, as an appeal from a 
final Order entered in the civil proceeding. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the lower Court commit an error in law by failing to 
award alimony based upon the evidence admitted and the failure to 
apply the correct standards as required by law, and did Judge David 
S. Young demonstrate a bias or prejudice either against the 
Defendant or her attorney or in favor of the opposing party 
requiring him to disqualify himself from further proceedings in 
this case. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES 
Section 30-3-5, U.C.A. 
3. The Court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent 
changes or new orders for the support and maintenance of 
the parties, the custody of the children and their 
support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the 
distribution of the property and obligations for debts as 
is reasonable and necessary. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an Amended Decree of Divorce and 
Judgment entered by the Honorable David S. Young. The Amended 
Decree of Divorce and Judgment was entered on January 24, 1994, and 
provided, in pertinent part, as follows: 
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9. The Plaintiff is ordered to pay the Defendant the 
sum of $1,450 per month in alimony until the 
Defendant either remarries, unlawfully cohabits or 
dies. 
In support of the foregoing, the Court entered its 
Findings of Fact as follows: 
15. The Court finds that the Defendant is in financial 
need, the Defendant is presently unable to assist 
herself financially to the extent where she may be 
self-sufficient without financial assistance from 
the Plaintiff, and that the Plaintiff is able to 
assist the Defendant financially by paying alimony 
support to her as more specifically set forth 
below. 
16. The Court finds that the parties were married for 
42 years, that the Defendant did not work 
throughout their marriage with any exceptions being 
remote and insignificant, and further, that 
Defendant has no marketable skills or employment 
experience. 
17. The Court finds that the Plaintiff is 61 years old, 
being born on December 11, 1931, and the Defendant 
is 60 years old, being born on February 2, 1932. 
The Court finds that the Defendant suffers from 
diabetes, and together with the above-stated facts, 
finds that Defendant will not likely be able to 
obtain employment in the future. The Court finds 
that the Plaintiff is employed by his business 
known as Ernstsen Plumbing & Heating, and that he 
will likely be able to continue with his employment 
there at present. 
18. The Court finds that Plaintiff's income to be as 
follows: The Plaintiff receives wages from his 
earnings and labor at Ernstsen Plumbing & Heating 
in the amount of $643.46 per week gross, which by 
multiplying this figure by 52 (for the number of 
weeks in the year) and then being divided by 12 
(for the number of calendar months) equals $2,808 
per month. 
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The Court finds that pursuant to the parties' 
stipulated division of the marital estate, they 
each will be awarded $95,215 in valued property. 
The Court finds that the valued property which each 
party shall receive herein of $95,215 are working 
assets. The Court finds that resulting from the 
marital property, that each party will receive, 
being a working asset, that their asset could earn 
8-1/2% interest per year which equates to $674.43 
per month. The Plaintiff further receives $784.80 
per week, as income from his share of marital 
property he will receive herein, that the 
difference between the said $784.80 and his weekly 
gross income of $643.43 is $141.34, which is 
equitable surplus to the Plaintiff. 
The Court finds that the Plaintiff's monthly income 
is the gross monthly wage of $2,808 added to his 
equitable surplus of $141.46 equalling $2,949.34. 
The Court further finds that dividing the 
Plaintiff's gross monthly income of $2,949.34 by 
two, the incomes of the parties will be equal in 
the sum of $1,474.67. 
The Court therefore finds that the Plaintiff should 
pay the Defendant the sum of $1,450 per month in 
alimony until the Defendant either remarries, 
unlawfully cohabits or dies. 
The Court finds that there is a balance of 
$9,000.00 owing to Zion's Bank for the garage at 
the Current Creek, Utah, cabin, and that there are 
eight payments left on the term of the loan. 
The Court finds that there is a balance of 
$11,500.00 owing to GMAC for the 1991 Ford 
Explorer, and that there are thirty payments left 
on the term of the loan. 
The Court recognizes that the Defendant has a $721. 
per month debt owing to Zion's Bank for the garage; 
a $455.00 auto payment, and a $300.00 per month tax 
liability on alimony. 
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26. The Court finds that based on the alimony award, it 
is reasonable that the Defendant refinance the two 
major expenses of her current monthly expenses, the 
$721.00 mortgage payment and the $455.00 auto 
payment over a fifteen year period. 
27. The Court further finds that based on the alimony 
award, the Defendant has an obligation to engage in 
creative financial planning. 
28. The Court finds that the $721.00 per month payment 
owing on the garage to the Current Creek, Utah, 
cabin is not a rental expense to the Defendant. 
The issue presented by appeal is that the Court committed 
an error in law by failing to award alimony based upon the evidence 
admitted and adopted by the Court, the failure to apply the correct 
standards required by law, and in doing so, Judge David S. Young 
became so engrossed in his personal position, that he failed to 
judge the case impartially based on the facts presented and the 
arguments advanced by counsel and should be required to disqualify 
himself from further proceedings in this case. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1. Plaintiff filed a Complaint for Divorce on October 
8, 1991. [R 2] 
2. The Defendant filed an Answer to Plaintiff's 
Complaint for Divorce on October 18, 1991. [R7] 
3. The Defendant filed a Motion for Temporary Support 
on October 25, 1991. [R 10] 
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4. The Motion for Temporary Support was heard on 
November 18, 1991, before Commissioner Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. The 
Commissioner made the following findings regarding Plaintiff's 
income: 
(1) The court finds that the Plaintiff's income as 
represented by each of the parties is approximately 
$7f000 a month. The court further finds that even 
with deductions for the payment of outstanding 
vehicle loans, the Plaintiff's income is still at 
least $5/000 per month. Based upon such income, 
the court concludes that the alimony requested by 
the Defendant in the amount of $2,000 is a 
reasonable amount to be awarded. Further, the 
court finds that such an award essentially 
preserves the status quo between the parties. 
Accordingly, it is ordered that the Plaintiff shall 
pay to the defendant the sum of $2,000 per month as 
temporary alimony during the pendency of these 
proceedings commencing with the month of November, 
1991. [R 23-24] 
(2) The Defendant has had continuous use of an 
automobile and shall continue to have use of that 
same automobile through the pendency of these 
proceedings. [R 23-24] 
5. A pre-trial settlement conference was held on 
November 5, 1992, before Commissioner Sandra N. Peuler. 
Commissioner Peuler proposed that alimony be set at $2,000 per 
month. [R 93] 
6. A pre-trial settlement conference was held on 
January 4, 1993, before the Honorable David S. Young. [R 100] 
7. At the pre-trial settlement conference, Judge Young 
attempted very strenuously to cause the Defendant to accept 
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settlement in this case. He told the Defendant that she had better 
settle this case for $1,400 in alimony because she would not get 
that much at trial. [R 144-145] 
8. At the pre-trial settlement conference, Judge Young 
indicated that for the purpose of determining alimony, he was not 
going to recognize the income earned from the lease-back 
automobiles by Plaintiff to Ernstsen Plumbing. Further, Judge 
Young began to argue a personal theory of his own, not supported by 
argument from counsel for either of the parties. His theory was 
that the Plaintiff cannot be awarded an asset that earns income and 
then be charged for that income to determine alimony. [R 145] 
9. A trial was held before the Honorable David S. Young 
on January 7 and 8, 1993. [R 103] 
10. Judge Young ruled from the bench as to the various 
matters contested by the parties. [R 105-106] 
11. On February 12, 1993, the Defendant filed a Rule 63 
Motion and Memorandum for Recusal. [R 118-127] 
12. On February 12, 1993, the Defendant filed a Rule 59 
Motion and Memorandum for New Trial. [R 128-141] 
13. On December 1, 1993, the Defendants Motion for 
Recusal was denied, and the matter was referred back to the 
assigned Judge to resolve all post-trial motions. [R 352-356] 
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14. On December 13, 1993, the Court denied the 
Defendant's Rule 59 Motion for New Trial. [R 360-362] 
15. On December 22, 1993, the Defendant filed a Motion 
for Entry of Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Amended Decree of Divorce. [R 363-365] 
16. The Court entered its Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Amended Decree of Divorce on January 20, 
1994. [R 385-398] 
17. The Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
on February 1, 1994. [R 399-400] 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties were married on January 7, 1951. [TR 
478] 
2. Three children were born as issue of the marriage, 
and all three children have reached the age of majority. [TR 478-
479] 
3. The Plaintiff is self-employed and is the sole stock 
holder in Ernstsen Plumbing. [TR 479] 
4. The parties stipulated that the value of Ernstsen 
Plumbing was $95,000. [TR 475] 
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5. Plaintiff testified that his gross pay is $643.46 
per week from wages and $778.78 per week gross from leasing his 
personally owned trucks to Ernstsen Plumbing. [TR 481, 486-487] 
6. Plaintiff testified that his gross monthly income 
received from wages and the lease money was $5,237 [TR 497], and 
that his net monthly income was $4,301.52. [TR 488-489] 
7. The Plaintiff testified that there were nine 
payments remaining on the home improvement loan for the garage 
built on Creek Cabin property. [TR 489] 
8. The Plaintiff testified that he does not have any 
living expenses as he is living with his girlfriend, Michelle 
Howard, and her house is paid for. [TR 492] 
9. The Plaintiff testified that Michelle Howard is 
employed by Ernstsen Plumbing. [TR 494] 
10. The Plaintiff testified that he is wholly and 
completely responsible for determining his own income as he is the 
sole share holder and chief executive officer in Ernstsen Plumbing. 
TR 496] 
11. The Plaintiff testified that when the action 
commenced, he was earning $828 per week, and that in September, 
1992, he decreased his salary to $643.46 per week. [TR 496] 
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12. The Plaintiff testified that his personal 
automobile, auto insurance, tax and license are paid by Ernstsen 
Plumbing. [TR 505 and 509] 
13. The Plaintiff testified that his health, accident 
and life insurance are paid by Ernstsen Plumbing. [TR 507] 
14. The Plaintiff testified that he intends to marry his 
girlfriend, Michelle Howard, following the divorce from Ila 
Ernstsen. [TR 510] 
15. The Plaintiff testified that he currently has two 
children with Ms. Howard, and that in 1993, it was his intention to 
file tax returns as married with three children. [TR 510] 
16. The Defendant testified that she was not cunently 
employed. [TR 531] 
17. The Defendant testified that she worked for a wage 
about forty years ago. [TR 531] 
18. The Defendant testified that she is currently a 
severe diabetic and is required to take insulin on a daily basis. 
[TR 532] 
19. The Defendant testified that it would be very 
difficult for her to hold down a job because of her diabetic 
condition and the fact that she is sixty years of age. [TR 532] 
20. The Defendant testified that the cabin in Fruitland 
was the marital residence because the Plaintiff sold the family 
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home in Salt Lake City. The Defendant further testified that she 
is going to live in the Fruitland cabin and that will be her 
primary residence. [TR 533-534] 
21. The parties stipulated that the value of the cabin 
located in Fruitland, Utah, was $75,500. [TR 475] 
22. The Defendant testified that from time to time she 
would stay at her sister's home in Salt Lake City if the weather in 
Fruitland was too severe. [TR 533] 
23. The Defendant testified that during the marriage on 
at least two occasions, she traveled to Brazil, purchased horses, 
purchased new vehicles, and lived a lifestyle that was comfortable. 
[TR 534] 
24. Exhibit D-9 entitled, "Defendant's Current Monthly 
Expenses," was admitted into evidence without objection. [See 
Appendix] 
25. The Defendant testified that Exhibit D-9 reflected 
the living expenses for the lifestyle which she enjoyed during the 
marriage. [TR 535] 
26. The Defendant testified that she is currently 
incurring a condominium fee and will continue to incur that during 
most of the winter until she is able to move back to the marital 
residence in Fruitland. [TR 536] 
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27. The Defendant testified that she recognized the 
expenses substantially exceed any amount of money that she could 
expect to receive as an award of alimony, and that there are areas 
that she would have to cut back such as gifts, travel, retirement 
and savings. [TR 538-539] 
28. The Defendant testified that her insulin costs about 
$60 per month as insurance will not cover her diabetic condition or 
any treatment for her diabetic condition. [TR 539] 
29. The Defendant testified that she has received quotes 
from health insurance carriers regarding her current condition, and 
it is $300 per month at her present age with her condition. [TR 
540] 
30. The Defendant testified that she is requesting an 
award of alimony to help her meet her continuing expenses. [TR 541] 
31. The Defendant testified that she believed Mr. 
Ernstsen's gross income should be divided equally between the two 
of them. [TR 542] 
32. Defendant's Exhibit D-7 was admitted without 
objection. Exhibit D-7 is entitled "Spendable Income." [TR 409] 
[See Appendix] 
33. The Defendant's expert witness (accountant) Randall 
Petersen testified that the figures used to develop Exhibit D-7 
were taken exactly from the parties' tax returns for the years 
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1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991. [TR 411] The parties' tax returns were 
admitted into evidence without objection. [TR 468] [See Appendix] 
34. Randall Petersen, testified that the parties' four-
year average of spendable income was $60,454. [TR 410] 
35. Randall Petersen testified that the term "spendable 
income" is Plaintiff's net income after tax including add-back for 
depreciation. [TR 412] 
36. Randall Petersen testified that in developing 
Exhibit D-7, he added back depreciation because it represents a 
non-cash expense which is reflected on the books. [TR 412] 
37. Randall Petersen testified that the term "add 
corporate net income" represents the corporate net income that was 
part of the business valuation completed by Vaughn Cox. [See 
Appendix] This figure was included to demonstrate that if 
Plaintiff chose to make his salary whatever he makes it and leave 
income in the corporation he still has income available to him. [TR 
413] 
38. Randall Petersen testified that he was the expert in 
a case entitled Muir v. Muir, 847 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1992), and 
that he testified in that case using this exact same methodology. 
[TR 413] 
Judge Young noted for the record that he did not 
have any problem with Mr. Petersen's methodology. [TR 413] 
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39. Randall Petersen testified that the corporate 
profits on average should be added back to the Plaintiff's 
spendable income or cash available to him to spend. [TR 414] 
40. Randall Petersen testified that in making his 
analysis of "add corporate net income," he did not add back other 
benefits the Plaintiff might have received from the corporation 
such as automobile expenses or professional fees. He testified 
that corporate income is determined after those deductions. [TR 
414] 
41. Defendant's Exhibit D-8 was admitted without 
objection. Exhibit D-8 is entitled "Income and Alimony Analysis." 
[TR 415] [See Appendix] 
42. Randall Petersen testified that Exhibit D-8 is 
simply an attempt to demonstrate to the Court that if the Court 
were attempting to equalize the parties' incomes, what various 
incomes and alimony payments along with tax structure as it affects 
those payments would be and that it affects only gross income and 
the alimony award. [TR 415] 
43. Randall Petersen testified that the first table on 
Exhibit D-8 is a calculation of Mr. and Mrs. Ernstsen each filing 
as single individuals with one exemption. [TR 416] 
The second table that appears on Exhibit D-8 
represents Mrs. Ernstsen filing as a single individual with one 
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exemption and Mr. Ernstsen filing as head of household with two 
children. [TR 416] 
44. Randall Petersen testified that he did not use a 
joint filing status for Mr. Ernstsen but head of household status 
on the second table. However he testified that the joint filing 
status would probably produce more cash. [TR 416] 
45. Randall Petersen testified that he used the examples 
in the case of: $55,000, $65,000 and $75,000 gross income to Mr. 
Ernstsen. [TR 417] 
46• During direct examination of the witness (Randall 
Petersen) by counsel for the Defendant, Judge Young interrupted 
direct examination and began examining the witness: 
JUDGE YOUNG: Let me ask you this, Mr. Petersen. 
You, in this, have included the lease payment that 
he receives of plus or minus $200.00 a week on the 
trucks, of the vehicles. Now is that in 
calculating his income; is that correct. 
RANDALL PETERSON: Yes. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Now, if that is coming from a working 
asset which he receives as an asset anyway, why 
wouldn't it be comparably fair to say, well, if she 
receives an asset it could be working as well, 
therefore, that should be considered different than 
income off of earnings, it should be income off of 
equity? You see what I'm saying about that? 
RANDALL PETERSON: Well, I guess the way I would 
answer that is that if the trucks were, in fact, 
assets of the corporation, and they were, and in 
'91, one of those years he had no depreciation, so 
I assume a lot were paid for, he would not have the 
lease expenses to pay out if they were held by the 
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corporation, therefore, there would be more cash 
flow in the corporation to pay him additional 
compensation. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Well, I guess—let me ask it 
differently. I don't see that the location of the 
ownership, whether it is individual or corporate, 
makes that much difference in what I'm asking you, 
because if you take a net marital estate and you 
divide the net marital estate but one of the 
parties is receiving income from the operation of 
one of the assets, all right? Let's just take one 
party has a $100,000.00 C D . and the other party 
has a $100,000.00 house. All right? Now, why do 
you take the money earned off the C D . and call it 
income and leave the house idle and don't call it 
anything? 
RANDALL PETERSON Because the C D . is, in fact, 
earning income. 
JUDGE YOUNG: There is no question about that. But 
if the party wished to sell the house and make the 
house a $100,000.00 C D . it would be earning income 
and it would be offset. 
RANDALL PETERSON: Well, but in this case there is 
no reason to pay the lease payments out of the 
corporation and, in fact, I mean, he's simply 
replacing his wages with lease payments. I mean, 
you got to add those two together because that's 
total compensation to him. I mean, that's cash 
money that's coming out of the corporation and 
being expensed. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I recognize that. 
RANDALL PETERSON: And when you expense that at the 
corporate level, that has been down valuing the 
value of the corporation due to those lease 
payments. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Well, that's right. So if it's down 
valuing the corporation then you may have to re-
adjust the value of the corporation. 
15 
RANDALL PETERSON: No, that's already been done. 
He has used the net incomes after those expenses. 
I guess, still, my best example is take the lease 
payments and throw them out of there and give him 
compensation. And it's the same thing, the assets 
are held by the corporation and you're right, it 
doesn't matter where they're held. What you're 
talking about is the cash flow from the corporation 
to him in either the form of wages or lease 
payments. And if you don't pay him the lease 
payments then there's more cash available and I 
increase this add back for corporate income. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Well, I don't quite—it is not 
entirely clear to me how you would be considering 
those assets different, because if I've taken my 
example, and in your case the corporation is the 
$100,000.00 C D . and the cabin is the $100,000.00 
idle asset in this particular case, now if one 
party from their asset that is being awarded to 
them independently is receiving the working asset 
and the other is receiving the idle asset, why 
should you take the generated income off the 
working asset and call it personal income rather 
than from employment and effort when you don't take 
anything off the idle asset? 
RANDALL PETERSON: Well, the idle asset isn't 
producing income. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Well, I know that, but it can be 
changed. 
RANDALL PETERSON: Well, we are talking about where 
the person lives. I mean, there is no 
availability. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I'm not talking about where the 
person lives I'm talking about a recreational 
property and I'm talking about something that could 
be sold and changed into a working asset. It seems 
to me that you're mixing the—and this is where I'd 
like you to clarify it for me—but it seems to me 
that you're mixing the assets. And when you divide 
assets you ought to take the assets out and the 
earnings off of those assets. If one party keeps a 
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C D . that's going to give 'em income, another party 
keeps a cabin that's going to give 'em no income, 
then you don't take the party getting the C D . , 
throw that into their gross income because, for the 
purpose of paying alimony, because that's what 
they've chosen to do with their working asset. So 
what I'm saying— 
RANDALL PETERSON: I see what you're saying. Then 
I think what you've got to do is, because the 
corporation is the working asset, it is the thing 
that is producing the income, and if you are going 
to do that, maybe your best approach would be to 
assume, okay, let's take the equity on the real 
property asset and let's assume some kind of a 
return. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Right. Exactly 
RANDALL PETERSON: A three or four percent return 
currently is about all you can get out of it if you 
can convert it to cash, whatever that equity is. 
JUDGE YOUNG: You could do it that way or you could 
say, let's ignore both—I can see if he is keeping 
his earning low and then supplementing it by a 
lease payment that perhaps his earnings, in effect, 
are net higher, the asset is generating more 
earnings and I can see a need to make some 
adjustment in that regard, but if I take—let's 
just suppose this case. Suppose we have two 
people, husband and wife, married, and that they 
both bring into the marriage, prior to the 
marriage, an asset. She brings in a house worth 
$100,000.00, he has sold his prior house worth 
$100,000.00 and has contract income. Okay? 
RANDALL PETERSON: Mm-hmm. 
JUDGE YOUNG: All right, now, they live together in 
their marriage, and let's just assume that the 
contract comes into the marriage, all right? Now, 
when you divide the marriage up at the end do you 
say, well, okay, you keep the house, to her, in my 
example, but you get nothing because all of your 
contract income came into the marriage? 
17 
RANDALL PETERSON: I think you take the value of 
the house and you take the value of the contract. 
JUDGE YOUNG: And you back it out. 
RANDALL PETERSON: Whatever the outstanding value 
is you add them together. 
JUDGE YOUNG: After the marriage? 
RANDALL PETERSON: No, at the time of the divorce. 
Because they both had the benefit of the cash flow 
from the contract, right? 
JUDGE YOUNG: Right. 
RANDALL PETERSON: And as Terral and the family 
have had advantage of the income from Ernstsen 
Plumbing. And so you take the two assets, the 
house and whatever the contract balance remaining 
is, you add 'em together and divide by two. And 
the income over that period of time doesn't 
represent the return of principal payments, it only 
represents the interest portion of that. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I can see that. I don't have any 
problem following that one. I could do it that way 
too. 
RANDALL PETERSON: And that's my point here. I 
think that the corporation has provided a return in 
terms of cash to this family to live on and that's 
what I'm trying to arrive at. What is the cash 
available from the business to provide them a 
living. I mean, we have looked at the asset itself 
and valued it and said it's worth $95,000.00, and I 
think that value is in the trucks and the equipment 
and the good will and the accounts receivable. I 
think those are all assets that are value. I don't 
think it has anything to do with the income that 
was generated by that asset for the family to live 
on. I mean, it looks to me like you got to look at 
it in terms of cash that was available after they 
pay taxes and all the other things. Again, he 
could have left his salary. Instead of $40,000.00 
he could have left it at $20,000.00 and we'd have 
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another $20,000.00 of income in the corporation. 
And I think you can't ignore that. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I agree. I don't have any problem 
with that but I do see a difference in, if you're 
dividing a marital estate and you're dividing 
equities, once you divide the equities you can't 
very well say that one equity, which goes to him, 
is nevertheless going to be eroding by the annual 
yield off of that equity for the purpose of 
dividing—or for the purpose of supplementing his 
income. To me, that doesn't make sense. 
RANDALL PETERSON: Well, but here we put the value 
that we're—Vaughn Cox has put the value of the 
vehicles into the corporation. Now the value of 
the corporation is established. If that had been 
the case in all of these years that he was taking 
lease payments out of there, there'd be more 
income. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I understand that. 
RANDALL PETERSON: That's the best analogy I can 
make, I think. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Thank you. 
[TR 418-424] 
47. Counsel for the Defendant resumed direct 
examination. Randall Petersen testified Exhibit D-7 contains 
lease back payments. [TR 425] 
48. On cross-examination, Randall Petersen testified 
that the principle payments on the automobiles would have to be a 
reduction of the cash flow analysis. [TR 426] 
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49. On cross-examination, Randall Petersen testified 
that both charts used after-tax numbers for the corporation. [TR 
427] 
50. On cross-examination, Randall Petersen testified 
that depreciation is a recovery of the costs of the asset if you 
pay $20,000 for a vehicle and write it off over a period of five 
years, you are going to recognize $4,000 a year in depreciation 
deduction. [TR 428] Counsel for Plaintiff then asked if that was 
cash by another name. The witness responded that it depends on 
what you were to buy the asset with, if you borrowed debt or if you 
paid cash for it. Judge Young then interrupted the examination: 
JUDGE YOUNG: But you still have to pay that. 
RANDALL PETERSON: Sure you do. 
JUDGE YOUNG: It seems to me your numbers here are 
a bit suspect because if I have $25,000.00 cash and 
I pay $25,000.00 for a vehicle and then I 
depreciate it over five years at $5,000 a year, and 
then in the meantime I've taken a figure here and 
add it back in, I paid out $25,000 at the front, I 
only get $25,000 depreciation credit, I've got my 
depreciation and my cash have got to equal each 
other out. 
RANDALL PETERSON: If you use $25,000.00 of 
previous earnings to do that with, though, you 
haven't laid the cash out. You haven't written a 
check. You don't write a check for depreciation. 
And I guess the best example would be, what if you 
bought that asset and wrote it off over five years 
and used it for another five years, what is your 
cash flow affect from that. 
JUDGE YOUNG: What is it? 
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RANDALL PETERSON: There is no cash flow. There is 
no negative cash flow from the fact that you use it 
beyond its life. And I don't know the ages, I 
don't have the detailed depreciation schedules of 
these vehicles. 
JUDGE YOUNG: It seems to me that illustrates the 
very reason why I ought not to consider that as an 
income asset, I ought to consider it as an equity 
asset. I mean, people all the time get awarded all 
of their equity, furniture that costs them 
$20,000.00 that's worth three and they keep it for 
the next 30 years even though it is worth three, 
but if they had to replace it they'd be coming up 
with 10 or 15 or $20,000.00 again. 
RANDALL PETERSON: I think that's the theory behind 
valuing it at whatever it's worth at the time it's 
divided. I don't understand the relationship 
there. When you talked about depreciation, I'm 
looking at 1988, and I'm looking at his income 
after he pays his taxes. I mean, he actually got 
$37,000.00 in lease payments according to his tax 
return in 1988. He paid out $4,700.00 worth of 
interest which has been deducted and he deducted 
$15,600.00 worth of depreciation. I don't know 
where that depreciation came from, but he didn't 
write a check. And that's what I was trying to 
arrive at, is what the cash flow to this family is 
in 1988, '89, '90 and '91. I think if you take it 
over a long period of time you'll get the same 
results. I'm looking at cash flow. 
[TR 428-430] 
MR. WARD: Can depreciation ever exceed what you 
pay for an asset. 
RANDALL PETERSON: No. 
JUDGE YOUNG: But the use can. 
RANDALL PETERSON: Sure. And does quite often. 
JUDGE YOUNG: And mostly it does. And that's the 
very reason, or part of the reason why you, it 
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seems to me, that to end the asset with its own 
equity rather than consider it an income-producing 
asset thereafter is the equitable way to deal with 
that because the cabin would do—I would have the 
same results with the cabin. The cabin—it's 
simply an elective decision that's made by the 
parties rather than a decision that's made by the 
court to ascribe income to that asset. 
RANDALL PETERSON: I believe your analogy is 
correct on the cabin. I believe that if we use the 
income that comes from the asset, the business, 
that we have, you would have to make an assumption 
that the cabin has value, and if you converted it 
to cash, whatever the equity might be between the 
debt that's owed on it and its value, then you 
would assume some kind of income, attribute some 
kind of income. I don't think that would be 
inappropriate. I agree with you. I think that the 
cabin does represent a non-income producing asset 
that is being reflected in the income of the two 
parties. I agree. But to ignore the lease 
payments, I think, would not be the correct way, 
because the corporation is, in fact, generating 
income and I think the income is being represented 
here. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Well, I don't have any problem 
concluding with you that the wages are under-
represented under the circumstances of what the 
corporation can yield and they've simply 
transferred 'em to another method. 
RANDALL PETERSON: Okay. 
JUDGE YOUNG: But the question that I come to is, I 
can't take all of the alternative method or I'm 
generating, or I'm taking income off an asset. 
I've got to figure out a portion of it. You get 
better treatment in a truck with depreciation than 
you get in a cabin. You get better treatment in 
the ability to ascribe even—he could even lease 
the truck at a much higher payment to himself than 
might even be the payment of a lease company had he 
gone down to Garff Ford and bought a truck and 
leased the truck. 
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RANDALL PETERSON: It's done quite often, your 
honor. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Sure. So when he does that—but what 
I ought to be doing is not taking the whole of the 
lease payment, I ought to be taking that factor, 
which should really be income, that would be 
generated by a legitimate reduction of income, in 
order to get it from the other method to avoid FICA 
and the other taxes. 
RANDALL PETERSON: Unfortunately, the only thing I 
have to deal with here are the tax returns. And 
that's what I've attempted to use in determining 
what the income of these parties is. 
JUDGE YOUNG: But it seems to me you have taken the 
highest number, which you know gives me a problem 
to deal with, because I've taken the gross number 
rather than ascribe some number like what you've 
suggested that would be that portion of the lease 
income yield that exceeds the appropriate cost of 
the lease. 
RANDALL PETERSON: Well, you're talking about a 
whole lot of work to make that determination. It 
seems to me it would be easier for you to make the 
determination of what the equivalent return might 
be on the cabin. I mean, it seems to me that's a 
whole—that the corporation is a known, the 
corporation has facts and figures that I believe 
you can rely on. They have been prepared by an 
independent C.P.A. I think the figures are there 
and if you want to take the cabin and ascribe some 
income theory from that to offset, to reduce income 
or to increase the value of the income and ascribe 
it to her, that might be appropriate that I did not 
do. 
JUDGE YOUNG: That would not be—I know who called 
you. And that would not be in the interest of the 
client who called you to do that. 
RANDALL PETERSON: That's not a normal calculation 
either because you have to assume that she gets rid 
of the asset. We are not making him get rid of his 
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asset and say take the money out of that and put it 
in a bank any more than you're requiring her to do 
that. I mean, you are assuming she liquidates the 
asset. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Then it would seem to me you should 
not erode his asset by ascribing that which comes 
from the asset as income. Any more than my 
analogy, I am not much farther ahead in this 
discussion than I was when I was dealing with the 
C.D.'s, because I don't know what portion of that 
income comes directly—let's say the business is 
worth $95,000.00 What portion of that income is a 
return on your $95,000.00 equity? That's the real 
question that I am after. 
RANDALL PETERSON: But you can see the income. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I can see the gross number you've 
given me. 
RANDALL PETERSEN: You can see his wages, you can 
see the lease payment and you can see the corporate 
income. Those, in fact, are income on his asset. 
He is going to be able to retain that asset and 
still produce that income in the future. I mean, 
it seems to me that that is the value of his 
earnings of the asset that he is going to maintain. 
[TR 428-434] 
51. Clark Ward then continued cross-examination. 
Randall Petersen testified that under the tax law, real property 
does depreciate like trucks do. [TR 434] 
52. Randall Petersen testified on cross-examination that 
with respect to Exhibit D-7, "add corporate income," that he did 
not have the financial statements but that he had the report of the 
appraiser (Vaughn Cox) and, if Mr. Ernst sen is on the accrual 
basis, very possibly the cash was not available, but over a long 
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period of time that cash would be and the $30,000 earned in 1988 
would theoretically be available in 1989. [TR 434] 
53. Randall Petersen testified on cross-examination that 
one could make the argument that not to leave some retained 
earnings in the company would be foolhardy. However, he testified 
that if the Plaintiff leaves his salary low and leaves the earnings 
there, you would not. You cannot ignore the fact that he leaves 
income in the corporation and that he could have cut his salary 
$20,000 and left $50,000 profit in there too. [TR 435]. 
54. Randall Petersen testified on cross-examination that 
he did not know whether this money was available to Mr. Ernstsen as 
he has not done an audit. [TR 435] 
55. Judge Young again began examination of the witness 
regarding the value of the business and asset and attributing 
income to the Plaintiff from that asset without attributing an 
income to the cabin: 
JUDGE YOUNG: Mr. Petersen, let's just assume that 
he had one that, what you say, left his salary low 
and had a $50,000.00 a year retained earning. If I 
am dealing with a divorce that I am thereafter 
liquidating the assets of the parties, then the 
marital estate is increased by the total value of 
the retained earnings. 
RANDALL PETERSON: Very possibly, yes. 
JUDGE YOUNG: So what I ought to do then is just 
simply take the total retained earnings, the 
parties, and whatever assets they have and divide 
them in half. The parties have themselves 
25 
determined that they will have fewer savings by 
determining a reduced income and that asset has 
then created an equity that can be divided. It 
seems to me what you are saying to me, though, is 
that even after dividing that equity I ought to 
also look at, if I give him that asset, I ought to 
look at what that equity was earning before and 
call that his income. The parties either have the 
benefit of having $20,000.00 income annually that 
they've lived off of and an increased marital 
estate at the difference of $50,000.00 which is 
divided, or if you are going to say what you,re 
suggesting to me, then you take all of the retained 
earnings because that's what's generating income, 
and you give it to one party, and you call the rest 
of it,you call all that comes off of that income 
for the purpose of dealing with alimony. That 
doesn't seem to be exactly equitable. You see what 
I'm saying by that? 
RANDALL PETERSON: But you take the $95,000.00 
asset that has been placed on the company and you 
look into the future and he has the ability to 
generate the income from that asset that he 
receives in the future just as he has in the past. 
The fact that the value of asset is there is you've 
already agreed that's what it's worth, that it is 
worth $95,000.00 and it is producing a whole lot 
better than a C D . will and he is going to produce 
that income. The income that we are looking at 
here, theoretically on into the future, and he is 
going to have it all. And it seems to me that the 
income from the asset is what needs to be used to 
determine what the alimony is. 
JUDGE YOUNG : So the only alternative you would 
suggest then is to take the calculation that you've 
given and follow those in full but ascribe an 
income to the cabin. 
RANDALL PETERSON: I would think that would be an 
appropriate—these are facts—I mean, these are 
hard numbers that we can look at. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Why should I ascribe an income to the 
cabin then, if I am going to do that then, of a 
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lower amount such as a three or four percent rather 
than suggest that—you see, with the cabin there 
are other values. There is a sentimental value, 
there is a historical value of use, things like 
that. 
RANDALL PETERSON: But the value is $75,000.00. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Exactly. Exactly. But one party may 
be unwilling to liquidate their asset because of 
these other significant values that are not 
recognized in numbers. 
RANDALL PETERSON: I can't deal with that. 
JUDGE YOUNG: That's why the problem that you give 
me is interesting because if one party determines 
that they'll work real hard with their asset and 
another party determines that they'll leave their 
asset idle and then you come in here and suggest to 
me that we ought to take all of the yield off the 
hard-working asset and call it an income for both 
of 'em for the purpose of determining alimony for 
both of 'em, then it seems to me that you're 
saving, not only is your asset here not worth its 
actual value because we are going to take and 
depreciate that asset or deduct from its value its 
yield. 
RANDALL PETERSON: I don't think you are deducting 
its value, the yield from its value. The value is 
what it is today. What its yield is what it can 
produce in income and that's what it has produced 
in income for these parties over the historical 
years. And will for him in the future. I mean, I 
really have a hard time believing that his real 
income in the future isn't going to be the 
determining factor on what you make alimony, it 
seems to me. 
JUDGE YOUNG: All right. 
RANDALL PETERSON: That's what he has the ability 
to pay with. 
[TR 435-438] 
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56. On re-direct, Randall Petersen testified that if the 
business sold five years from now, assuming that it remains 
constant, and there is no change, it would sell for $95,000. [TR 
440] 
57. Randall Petersen testified on re-direct that the 
Court referred to the profit, net profit as retained earnings, and 
that equity in the corporation is generally considered the same as 
retained earnings. [TR 440] 
58. Randall Petersen testified on re-direct that the 
profit which is referred to in Defendant's Exhibit 3 at Schedule 2 
[See Appendix] is net profit that Mr. Ernstsen, as the sole stock 
holder, if he elected, could take out of the corporation today or 
tomorrow, whatever the year end is. [TR 441] 
59. Randall Petersen testified on re-direct that in 
March, 1992, retained earnings was $68,000, but $30,000 of it was 
in the net profit portion. [TR 441] 
60. Randall Petersen testified on re-direct that 
corporate profit is part of the profit available for distribution 
and that, in fact, is the position that he has presented to the 
Court in Muir v. Muir, 847 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1992) [TR 442] 
61. Randall Petersen testified that with respect to 
Exhibit D-7, in the year 1991, the income available for 
distribution after tax was $77,994, and if you divide that by 
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twelve, cash available is $6,400, and from that, Mr. Ernst sen would 
pay the principle on the vehicles that he is currently purchasing 
which, based on his own exhibit, is approximately $1,300. leaving 
$5,200 [TR 242-243] 
62. Randall Petersen testified on re-direct that: 
The automobiles as Mr. Cox has treated them are an 
asset of the corporation rather than an asset of 
Mr. Ernstsen's in lease back, and if they were an 
asset of the corporation, then the corporation 
would pay those liabilities and Mr. Ernstsen would 
have the additional or have the $5,200 available to 
him. In addition, you are double counting to some 
degree because to get to the $7,700 number we have, 
in fact, deducted part of the lease payment or part 
of the contract payments through interest expense 
above. So in reality, instead of being at $5,200, 
he would be at $5,500 or $5,600 in round numbers. 
[TR 443-444] 
63. Randall Petersen testified on re-direct that 
"accrual basis" simply recognizes income as it is earned, not as it 
is necessarily collected. They have accounts receivable and may do 
a job, they don't get paid for it, they may get paid in another 
year, but you have to recognize it in the income in the year that 
you earn, so if you were on the accrual basis, he may or may not 
have cash available on this years to distribute those profits, but 
as the receivables are collected and the payables are paid, the 
$30,000 is going to be payable at some point in time. [TR 445-456] 
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64. Randall Petersen testified on re-direct that the 
only potential impact of that money is whether they were on accrual 
basis. [TR 446] 
65. Randall Petersen testified on re-direct that because 
he is on the accrual method, even though some of the money that was 
earned may never be collected, he has written it off to bad debts. 
[TR 447] 
66. Guy Morris, the Plaintiff's expert witness 
(accountant) testified that the depreciation expenses, over time, 
equals cash. He testified that if you pay $25,000 for a truck, 
whether you borrow the money or pay it right out of your pocket 
over the ^x' number of years, you will net $25,000 of depreciation. 
[TR 520] 
67. Mr. Morris testified that in his opinion, it is 
inappropriate to add the depreciation expense back. [TR 521] 
68. Mr. Morris testified that he had a problem adding 
back $32,000 in depreciation and a problem with saying that $14,000 
of corporate income is available for Mr. Ernstsen to spend because 
he really didn't believe that it was. [TR 522] 
69. In cross-examination, Mr. Morris testified that the 
corporate income is available for distribution if it is cash. [TR 
526-527] 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Court committed an error in law by failing to award 
alimony based upon the evidence admitted and by failing to apply 
correct standards as required by law. The Court refused to apply 
the standards set by the State of Utah to be used in determining 
the amount of alimony to be awarded to the Defendant in this case. 
While the Court did recognize and adopt the principle that in a 
long-term marriage, alimony should "equalize the parties' 
respective standards of living and maintain them at a level as 
close as possible to the standard of living enjoyed during the 
marriage," as established in Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 
(Utah 1988), and most recently reaffirmed in Howell v. Howell. 802 
P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991); the Court failed to take into 
consideration all of the income of the Plaintiff, and ignored his 
historical income. In addition, it is unreasonable and 
inappropriate to require the Defendant to use her automobile, her 
furniture and her home to generate income as a set-off against the 
Plaintiff's ability to pay alimony. 
Judge Young took a personal position and became an 
advocate in these proceedings. Judge Young became so engrossed in 
his personal position that he failed to judge the case impartially 
based on the facts presented and the arguments made by counsel. 
Instead, Judge Young made a decision based upon the position which 
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he had advanced at pre-trial and at trial, and the advocacy of 
Judge Young in these proceedings has invoked suspicion on the part 
of the Defendant that as long as Judge Young presides over her 
case, she will never "be able to obtain a fair and impartial trial 
in all matters of litigation," Even though Judge Young may have no 
personal bias against the Defendant, it is clear that he has 
imposed his personal will and advocacy in this case, and that it 
will never be possible for the Defendant to receive a fair trial 
before Judge Young. 
In a domestic case, where the trial court has awarded 
attorney's fees and the receiving spouse has prevailed on the main 
issues, the Court generally awards fees on appeal. The appellate 
court should award the Appellant attorney's fees on appeal and 
remand for determination of the amount of reasonable fees. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR IN LAW BY 
AWARDING THE DEFENDANT $1,450.00 PER MONTH AS 
ALIMONY. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Trial courts have broad discretion when making alimony 
awards, Haumont v. Haumont, 793, P.2d 421-423, (Utah App. 1990). 
The appellate court will not upset a trial court for the award of 
alimony so long as the trial court exercises its discretion within 
the appropriate legal standards, Id. The court will not disturb 
the trial court's award of spousal support absent a showing of 
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abuse of clear and prejudicial discretion, Paffel v. Paffel, 732 
P.2d 96-100 (Utah 1986). 
A. The Court committed an error in law by failing to 
award alimony based upon the evidence admitted and the failure to 
apply the correct standards as required by law. 
The courts have developed three factors which must 
be considered in a fixing of reasonable alimony award: (a) 
financial conditions and needs of the wife; (b) the ability of the 
wife to produce income for herself; (c) the ability of the husband 
to provide support. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 172 (Utah 1985). 
Failure to consider the Jones factors in fashioning alimony awards 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. Stephens v. Stephens. 54 P.2d 
952, 958 (Utah 1988). 
In this case, the Court ignored the first 
consideration in fixing alimony—"the needs of the wife." While 
the Court recognized Defendant's expense statement (D-9), and while 
that expense statement was admitted as uncontested evidence, the 
Judge in this case took it upon himself to assert that while the 
Defendant's expenses were recognized and were legitimate, those 
expenses could be adjusted. The Judgef sua sponte, asserted the 
found that a woman of sixty-one, having no abilities of being 
employed, and no income history, would be able to refinance her 
liabilities over fifteen years. [See Findings of Fact and 
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Conclusions of Law] Not only did the Judge assert that the 
liabilities could be refinanced to be paid in fifteen years, he 
stated that it was reasonable to expect the automobile to be 
financed for that length of time. Even after stating that he 
recognized the wife's needs, the Judge completely ignored her 
needs. In addition, because of the Judge's personal position in 
this case, he made findings for the restructuring of the different 
liabilities, which are not only improbable, but likely impossible 
in light of the Defendant's health and age, income earning 
abilities, and the fact that no financial institution will finance 
an automobile for fifteen years. 
In considering the second factor required by law, 
the ability of the wife to produce sufficient income for herself, 
the Court recognized that the Defendant had absolutely no chance of 
employability. However, the Court attributed to the Defendant the 
ability to earn income from the property awarded to her. That 
property is identified in the Defendant's Exhibit No. 6 [See 
Appendix], which was admitted by the Court as identification and 
valuation of the parties' property. It is clear from the exhibit 
that the Defendant was awarded a "cabin" (the marital residence) in 
Fruitland, Utah, two parcels of real property valued at $2,800, 
furniture valued at $1,500, and her automobile valued at $1,600. 
The Defendant testified that the Fruitland cabin is her personal 
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residence and that she intended to live there. [TR 533-534] That 
testimony was unrefuted by any evidence or testimony presented by 
the Plaintiff. The Court then found that the assets awarded to the 
Defendant were valued at $95,215, and entitled those "working 
assets." The Judge then stated arbitrarily that the assets could 
reasonably be expected to earn a return of $674 per month. That 
amount was then attributed to the Defendant as earned income. The 
Court clearly erred by ruling that income would be earned from the 
assets awarded to Defendant. That issue was addressed in English 
v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah 1977), where the Court held: 
There is a distinction between the assets 
accumulated during a marriage, which are 
distributed on an equitable basis, and the 
post-marital duty of support and maintenance. 
See also Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980). 
The Court erred in the position that because the 
Plaintiff was awarded Ernstsen Plumbing & Heating and several 
vehicles (which were valued as part of Ernstsen Plumbing), and 
because Plaintiff earned an income from those assets, it would be 
inequitable to fail to identify as "working assets" those assets 
awarded to the Defendant. It is clear that the Court erred in its 
application of the law in this case. It is unreasonable and 
inappropriate to require the Defendant to use her automobile, her 
furniture and her home to generate income to set off against the 
Plaintiff's ability to pay alimony. 
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Considering the third factor by law, the ability of 
the husband to provide support, the Court has simply ignored the 
historical earnings of the husband as presented by Defendant's 
expert and uncontested by the Plaintiff. In fact, the only person 
in the Court who argued with the Defendant's expert, or presented 
any position in opposition to the Defendant's expert, was the 
Judge. The testimony of Defendant's expert was that the historical 
adjusted gross income of the Plaintiff based on a four-year average 
was $66,025 annually, or $5,502 per month. That income was 
supported by Defendant's Exhibit No. 7 [See Appendix] which was 
admitted by the Court. That figure does not include corporate net 
income in the amount of $14,385, which the Court was required to 
consider pursuant to Muir v. Muir, 847 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1992). 
Further, Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 5 [See Appendix], 
which was admitted into evidence showed the Court that the 
Plaintiff, by his admission, has a monthly cash flow of $5,237. 
The Plaintiff's own evidence was that he received weekly lease 
payments of $780 for the vehicles and a weekly net salary of $427 
per week from Ernstsen Plumbing. In addition, the Plaintiff 
testified repeatedly that for the last three years, his income had 
been exactly the same, and that it had only changed in August, 
1992, having been reduced by $500 per month. The Court completely 
ignored the historical income of the Plaintiff as required by Utah 
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case law. See Cumminqs v. Cumminqs, 562 P.2d 229 (Utah 1977); 
Westenskow v. Westenskow, 562 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1977); Hinckley v. 
Hinckley. 815 P.2d 1352 (Utah App. 1991). 
The Court refused to apply the standards set by the 
State of Utah to be used in determining the amount of alimony to be 
awarded to the Defendant in this case. While the Court did 
recognize the principal that in a long-term marriage, alimony 
should "equalize the parties/ respective standards of living and 
maintain them at a level as close as possible to the standard of 
living enjoyed during the marriage" as established in Gardner v. 
Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 (Utah 1988), and most recently reaffirmed in 
Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991); the Court failed 
to take into consideration all of the income of the Plaintiff. 
This is true even though the Plaintiff admitted and agreed with the 
Defendant's position in his testimony and his exhibits presented to 
the Court and admitted for consideration. The lower court's 
decision awarding the Defendant $1,450 in alimony should be 
remanded with instructions that Defendant shall not be required to 
use her automobile, her furniture or her home to generate income to 
set off against the Plaintiff's ability to pay alimony, and the 
Court must take into consideration all income of the Plaintiff when 
equalizing the parties' respective standards of living. Further, 
this Court should instruct the lower court to enter an award of 
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alimony which reflects 50% of Plaintiff's historical earning of 
$5,502 per month making alimony $2,750 per month, said award to be 
retroactive to the date of entry of the original Decree of Divorce. 
B. Judge Young predicated his personal hypothetical 
position and engaged in the position of an advocate in support of 
that theory rather than allowing the case to be tried to him. 
The Judge stated at pre-trial that the Defendant 
should accept $1,400 as alimony because it was not likely that she 
would be awarded that much at trial. [See Affidavit of Ila 
Ernstsen - Appendix] Judge Young also stated at the pre-trial that 
the Court was not going to include the income earned by the 
Plaintiff in his "lease back" of automobiles to the family 
business, which was primarily for the purpose of saving taxes. [See 
Affidavit of Ila Ernstsen - See Appendix] 
At the trial, Judge Young became an advocate on 
behalf of his personal position rather than allowing the evidence 
to be presented to the Court and then ruling objectively. In the 
first 37 pages of the transcript of the expert witness, two pages 
are dedicated to the identification and table of contents and the 
next three pages are dedicated to the foundation to qualify the 
expert. Accordingly, there are 31 pages of direct and cross 
examination by counsel for the Defendant and counsel for the 
Plaintiff. Of those 31 pages, 19 are taken up by Judge Young's 
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examination of the witness. Judge Young's examination of the 
witness is dedicated primarily to support for a position advanced 
by Judge Young at pre-trial, during the trial proceedings, and 
significantly during the examination of this witness. Fully, 60% 
of the examination of the witness was conducted by Judge Young in 
support of and to advance his personal theory that "income should 
be attributed to an idle asset." 
Once this theory was advanced by Judge Young, he 
continued to perpetuate the theory throughout the trial. 
Ultimately, Judge Young's theory that an idle asset should be 
treated as working capital resulted in an Order diminishing the 
amount of alimony awarded to the Defendant. Further, it resulted in 
an Order by Judge Young which comported almost exactly with his 
pre-trial announcement that the Defendant should "take $1,400 
alimony because she would likely not get the amount at trial." [see 
Affidavit of Ila Ernstsen] 
Further, Judge Young became so attached to his 
personal position that he ascribed earning capability not only to 
the home but to the Defendant's furniture and furnishings as well 
as to her automobile. Judge Young became so engrossed in his 
personal position that he failed to judge the case impartially 
based on the facts which were established and the arguments 
presented by counsel. Instead, Judge Young made a decision based 
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upon the position which he advanced at pre-trial and at trial, 
including examination as demonstrated by the transcript. 
This case is similar to Marchant v. Marchant, 743 
P.2d. 199 (Utah App. 1987). In that case, Judge Tibbs made 
comments during the trial which clearly expressed the Judge's bias 
and opposition to the wife's position in that case. In remanding 
the Marchant case and directing Judge Tibbs to recuse himself, this 
Court stated: 
We have previously offered our opinion 
concerning this all to common expression [by a 
judge] of an inability to deal with a 
differing point of view. 
The appellate Court addressed the issue of bias in 
Marchant sua sponte, since the issue was not brought up in the 
lower court. The Marchant opinion restated the general philosophy 
regarding bias as expressed in Haslam v. Morrison, 190 P.2d 520 
(Utah 1948). In quoting the Haslam opinion, the Court went on to 
quote Justice Wade from a concurring opinions 
One of the most important things in government 
is that all persons subject to its 
jurisdiction shall always be able to obtain a 
fair and impartial trial in all matters of 
litigation in its courts. It is nearly as 
important that the people have absolute 
confidence in the integrity of the courts. I 
can think of nothing which would as surely 
bring the courts into disrepute as for a judge 
to insist on trying a case where one of the 
litigant's believes that the judge is bias and 
prejudice against him. At 526. 
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It is clear that the Judge imposed a personal will 
in this case which was not supported by the parties, their counsel 
or the evidence, nor was it supported by the law. He simply took 
a personal position and became an advocate in these proceedings. 
The advocacy of Judge Young in these proceedings has invoked 
suspicion on the part of Defendant that as long as Judge Young 
presides over her case, she will never "be able to obtain a fair 
and impartial trial in all matters of litigation." Even though 
Judge Young may have no personal bias against the Defendant, it is 
clear that he has imposed his personal will and advocacy in this 
case, and that it will never be possible for the Defendant to 
receive a fair trial before Judge Young. Judge Young should be 
removed from further proceedings in this case and a new Judge 
should be assigned. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The Appellant seeks an award of attorney's fees on 
appeal. The trial court made the finding that the Defendant is in 
financial need and that the Plaintiff is capable of contributing to 
the Defendant's attorney's fees and awarded her $4,000 in 
attorney's fees to be paid by the Plaintiff. In a domestic case, 
where the trial court has awarded attorney's fees and the receiving 
spouse has prevailed on the main issues, the Court generally awards 
fees on appeal. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d 1018, 1037 (Utah App. 
41 
1993); Allred v. Allred, 835 P.2d 974, 979 (Utah App. 1992). As 
such, the appellate court should award the Appellant attorney's 
fees on appeal and remand for determination of the amount of 
reasonable fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The Judge became so personally involved in establishing 
a personal position he wanted to adopt that he ignored all of the 
evidence and testimony presented in this case and failed to apply 
the law based on the evidence admitted. In adopting that position, 
the Court refused to recognize Defendant's historical income and 
even ignored all of the Defendant's present income, attributed 
income potential to dormant assets awarded to the Defendant, 
attributed income to the Defendant which did not exist as a matter 
of evidence, and by virtue of the Court's insistence on enforcing 
its position and being involved in the case as an advocate, the 
Court committed an egregious error at law. The Court has failed to 
consider the historical income of the Plaintiff and has mixed the 
division of assets with "...the post marital duty of support and 
maintenance" in violation of Utah case law. 
This Court should remand this case with instructions to 
the lower court to enter an award of alimony based upon Plaintiff's 
historical earnings. This Court should further instruct the lower 
court that based upon the unrefuted evidence presented at trial, 
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the award of alimony should be $2,750 per month retroactive to the 
date of entry of the original Decree of Divorce. 
Judge Young should be directed to recuse himself from 
further proceedings in this case and a new Judge should be 
assigned. It is clear that any further proceedings in this case 
will be tainted by a justifiable belief upon the part of the 
Defendant that she cannot receive a fair and adequate trial from 
the Judge Young because of his personal bias. 
In a domestic case, where the trial court has awarded 
attorney's fees and the receiving spouse has prevailed on the main 
issues, the Court generally awards fees on appeal. The appellate 
court should award the Appellant attorney's fees on appeal and 
remand for determination of tjie amount of reasonable fees. 
DATED this ^& day of June, 1994. 
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